

Resilience-Based Design of Communities

Prof. Dr. Božidar Stojadinović

Chair of Structural Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, ETH Zürich

Surviving Natural Hazards...



<http://willandjustingeo.weebly.com/natural-hazard-and-disaster.html>

<http://all-that-is-interesting.com/the-most-devastating-natural-disasters-of-the-21st>

<http://youth.wmo.int/met-subpages/natural-hazards-and-disasters>

<https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/new-zealand-earthquake-november-2016/>

http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/KOHO/Yoran2001ep/07_1.html

... Necessitates Resilience



Resilience is a Desirable Property... ... of Structural Elements



<https://fineartamerica.com/featured/ancient-greek-columns-or-pillars-iii-standing-tall-in-athens-greece-john-a-shiron.html>

Resilience is a Desirable Property... ... of Stand-Alone Structures



<https://www.dreamstime.com/stock-photo-lonely-house-river-drina-bajina-basta-serbia-image72565378>

Resilience is a Desirable Property... ... of Civil Infrastructure Systems




Resilience is a Desirable Property... ... of Mega-Cities




<http://www.lifestyleasia.com/492223/futuristic-city-singapores-skyline-changed-past-decade/>

Community Resilience is Systemic




<https://fitforrandomness.wordpress.com/2012/02/08/insurance-industry-super-spreaders-of-systemic-risk/>


Community Functions



Community Resilience is a Process



Measuring Community Resilience



Service Supply vs. Service Demand

Electric Power
Supply System




Community
Power Consumption



Service Supply/Demand Interaction for Civil Infrastructure Systems

Supply


Demand



Service Supply for Civil Infrastructure Systems

■ Infrastructure system supply:


- Suffers an (instantaneous) drop when the event occurs
- Recovers over time
- Depends on the vulnerability and recovery of elements of community infrastructure



Service Demand for Civil Infrastructure Systems


■ Infrastructure system demand:

- Suffers an (instantaneous) drop when the event occurs
- Recovers over time
- Depends on the vulnerability and recovery of elements of community infrastructure



Supply/Demand Formulation to Quantify Community Infrastructure Resilience

- Separately model the evolution of supply and demand
- Lack of resilience occurs when the supply cannot meet the demand**
 - Different rates of supply and demand loss absorption and recovery matter!




Supply/Demand Formulation to Quantify Community Infrastructure Resilience


- How to compute this?

$$\text{LoR} = \int_t \langle D - S \rangle dt$$

- Re-CoDeS** framework




Compositional Approach: Because Damage is Local




(a)



Compositional Approach: Because Damage is Local




Compositional Approach: Vulnerability Functions




$$P(F_{Loss} > f_{loss}^T | IM = im)$$

Figure 1: Hypothetical vulnerability curve




Source: Eqecat


Compositional Approach: Because Recover is Local, too





Compositional Approach: Recovery Functions





$$P(F_{Rec} > f_{rec}^T | DM = dm)$$





Compositional Approach: System Operation Model (Power Dispatch)



Compositional Approach: System Operation Model (**Emergency Dispatch**)




Compositional Supply/Demand Framework: Re-CoDeS



Compositional Supply/Demand Framework: Re-CoDeS

- Consider the uncertainties in:
 - Component performance
 - System performance
- (MC) simulations to characterize the probability distributions of supply and demand:
 - Median values shown




Re-CoDeS: Node Level

- Reserve margin
- Time for resilience assessment
 $t \in \{t_0, t_1\}$
- Lack of resilience is the area between the demand and the available supply curve

$$LoR_i = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \langle D_i(t) - S_{a,i}(t) \rangle dt$$

- Singularity function

$$\langle D - S \rangle = \begin{cases} D - S & \text{if } D > S \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



Re-CoDeS: Node Level


- Normalize by node demand:
 - Makes node-to-node comparison possible

- Node Resilience

$$\hat{R}_i = 1 - \widehat{LoR}_i$$

$$\hat{R}_i \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$\widehat{LoR}_i = \frac{\int_{t_0}^{t_1} \langle D_i(t) - S_{a,i}(t) \rangle dt}{\int_{t_0}^{t_1} \langle D_i(t) \rangle dt}$$



Re-CoDeS:

Supply Available at a Node

- Depends on the system **supply capacity** and losses due to:
 - Ageing, repairs
 - Transmission
- Depends on the state of system demand

$$S_{a,i}(t) = f\left(\sum_{k=1}^N (S_{c,max,k}(t) - S_{c,loss,k}(t))\right),$$

$$S_{c,loss,i}(t),$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^N (D_k(t) - D_i(t))$$

Re-CoDeS: System Level

- System available supply

$$S_{a,sys} \neq \sum_{i=1}^N S_{a,i}$$

- Node demand is not additive
 - Supply at nodes is correlated and depends on the operation of the system

- System Demand

$$D_{sys} = \sum_{i=1}^N D_i$$

- Node demand is additive
 - Assuming that demand at nodes is not correlated

Re-CoDeS: System Level

- Loss of resilience at the level of the system is not a simple sum of nodal loss of resilience
- System operation is governed by network physics, safety, and economic constraints
- EPSS dispatch:
 - Voltage balance
 - Current capacities
 - Network topology
 - Economy of baseload vs. peaking generation

$$LoR_{sys} \neq \sum_{i=1}^N LoR_i$$

$$LoR_{sys} = \bigoplus_{i=1}^N LoR_i$$

Re-CoDeS: Node Level


- Define node **consumption** as:

$$C_i(t) = \min\{S_{a,i}(t), D_i(t)\}$$

- A node will consume as much as it can
- Node consumption is additive


$$C_{sys} = \sum_{i=1}^N C_i$$

$$LoR_i = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \{D_i(t) - C_i(t)\} dt$$




Re-CoDeS: System Level

$$LoR_{sys} = \sum_{i=1}^N \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \{D_i(t) - C_i(t)\} dt = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} (D_{sys}(t) - C_{sys}(t)) dt$$



Re-CoDeS Framework




Measure of Resilience: Integral

- System Resilience


$$\hat{R}_{sys} = 1 - \widehat{LoR}_{sys}$$

$$\hat{R}_{sys} \in \{0, 1\}$$



$$\widehat{LoR}_{sys} = \frac{\int_{t_0}^{t_1} (D_{sys}(t) - C_{sys}(t)) dt}{\int_{t_0}^{t_1} D_{sys}(t) dt}$$



Integral Measure of Resilience: Repeated Lack of Resilience Scenario





Integral Measure of Resilience: “Pompeii” Scenario





Functionality framework

Integral Measure of Resilience: “Port of Kobe” Scenario





Functionality framework

Integral Measure of Resilience: Cellular Network Example




Functionality framework



Measure of Resilience: Instantaneous



Measure of Resilience: Instantaneous




Percentage of
people w/o power



Measure of Resilience: Probabilistic Formulation


- Consider the uncertainty in demand and in supply
- Estimate the probability of LoR exceeding an acceptable threshold
 - Confidence in resilience estimates



Re-CoDeS: Resilience Acceptance Criteria

- Evaluate the probability that system resilience will be below an acceptable threshold given:
 - The hazard environment
 - The vulnerability
 - Robustness
 - Redundancy
 - The capability to recover
 - Resourcefulness
 - Rapidity

$$P(\hat{R}_{sys} < \hat{r}_{sys} | [h, v, r])$$




Engineering Community Resilience

- Acceptance criteria are at the system level

$$P(\hat{R}_{sys} < \hat{r}_{sys} | [h, v, r])$$



(a)




Engineering Community Resilience

- An engineer designs a node of the system, one node at a time
- System-level acceptance criteria must be de-convolved to the node (component) level

$$P(\hat{R}_{sys} < \hat{r}_{sys} | [h, v, r])$$



(a)



De-Convolution of Resilience Acceptance Criteria: From Community to Components

■ Stakeholder perspective:








- Acceptable initial loss
 - Operational
 - Monetary
- Acceptable recovery tempo
 - Operational
 - Monetary

■ Societal perspective:

- Acceptable initial loss
 - Economic
 - Environmental
- Acceptable recovery tempo
 - Economic
 - Environmental

Functional Category: Cluster	(4) Support Needed	Overall Recovery Time for Hazard and Level Listed Expected Hazard Level									
		Phase 1 – Short-Term			Phase 2 – Intermediate			Phase 3 – Long-Term			
		0	Days 1	1-3	Wks 1-4	4-8	8-12	Mos 4-24	24+		
Power - Electric Utilities											
Bulk Generation											
Renewable, Non-Variable (Hydro, Biomass, Geothermal, Pump Storage)	R/C	90%	X								
Transmission (including Substations)											
Critical Response Facilities and Support Systems											
Hospitals, Police and Fire Stations / Emergency Operations Centers	R, C	90%	X								
Disaster debris / recycling centers/ related lifeline systems	R, C	60%	90%	X							
Emergency Housing and Support Systems											
Public Shelters / Nursing Homes / Food Distribution Centers	R, C	60%	90%	X							
Emergency shelter for response / recovery workforce/ Key Commercial and Finance	R, C		60%	90%	X						
Housing and Neighborhood infrastructure											
Essential city services / schools / Medical offices	R, C		60%	90%	X						
Houses of worship/meditation/ exercise	C		60%	90%	X						
Buildings/space for social services (e.g., child services) and prosecution activities	C		60%	90%	X						
Community Recovery Infrastructure											
Commercial and industrial businesses / Non-emergency city services	C			60%	90%	X					
Residential housing restoration	R, S, MS, C			60%	90%	X					
Distribution											
Critical Response Facilities and Support Systems											
Hospitals, Police and Fire Stations / Emergency Operations Centers	R, C	60%	90%	X							
Disaster debris / recycling centers/ related lifeline systems	R, C	60%	90%	X							
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Community Recovery Infrastructure											
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Residential housing restoration	R, S, MS, C			90%	X						

De-Convolution of Resilience Acceptance Criteria: From Community Outmigration to Component Robustness




De-Convolution of Resilience Acceptance Criteria: From Community Outmigration to Component Robustness

Entity	Performance objective
Community	<1% probability of significant outmigration
Vital functions	<i>Housing</i> : <5% of residents displaced <i>Employment</i> : <9% of businesses disrupted <i>Education</i> : <6% of students displaced <i>Public services</i> : <9% of capacity disrupted
Housing stock	<5% of residential buildings unsafe to occupy
Individual residential buildings	<5% probability of being unsafe to occupy


Engineering Community Resilience: Structural, Financial, Public Policies

- Resilience-based design is not only about robust new construction
- It is also about:
 - Retrofit of existing structures
 - Effective recovery of disrupted services and repair of incurred damage
- Investments drive the recovery process and community resilience decisions




Engineering Community Resilience: Structural, Financial, Public Policies

- Structural engineering measures:
 - Actuarial price or new construction or retrofit
- Financial engineering measures:
 - Viable risk transfer models
- Public policy measures:
 - Minimize the remaining losses



Financing Engineering Community Resilience

- Provide for investments to reduce vulnerability before the event:
 - Community taxes
 - Municipal bonds
- Provide the means for rapid recovery:
 - Catastrophe bonds
 - Earthquake Insurance
- Promote risk reduction through public policies



Challenge: Engineering Resilient Communities

- Preparedness
 - Component and System Engineering
 - Urban planning
 - Financial and Public policy
-
- Community risk is increasing:
 - Investment in community resilience is as important as investment in innovation and new technologies
 - **Engineering resilient communities is a key element of societal risk governance**



Acknowledgements

ETH Zurich

- Doctoral Students:
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 - Dr. Marco Broccardo

UC Berkeley

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 - Dr. Ady Aviram
 - Prof. Dr. Vesna Terzić
 - Dr. John-Michael Wong
 - Prof. Dr. Kevin Mackie

